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Perhaps no legal doctrine has been
the source of so much confusion and
misunderstanding as collateral estoppel. This is unfortunate since issues involving collateral estoppel arise in a
large number of cases, and when properly raised are often determinative of
the entire case.' For the practicing attorney, it is just as important to know
how to defend against an adversary's
use of collateral estoppel as it is to
know when and how to raise this doctrine offensively.
Collateral estoppel has assumed even
greater dimensions in the past few years
in the area of products liability. A finding of negligence against a manufacturer with regard to a particular product,
even where only nominal damages are
proved, creates a risk of preclusion of
the issue of the manufacturer's negligence in subsequent suits against the
manufacturer. Thus, the doctrine holds
the potential for catastrophic consequences for certain defendants, and the
possibility of obtaining a "free ride" for
certain plaintiffs. The failure of a litigator to recognize and raise a collateral
estoppel issue can have results seemingly out of all proportion to the doctrine itself.

Terminology
A primary source of confusion is terminology. While some cases and treatises refer to res judicata in a broad
sense, thereby including both issue and
claim preclusion,2 others use the term
to refer specifically to the preclusion of
claims, and "collateral estoppel" to
refer to the preclusion of issues.) Per-

haps because of this confusion, there is
a modern trend toward using the term
"claim preclusion" to describe the doctrine that holds that "an existing judgment is conclusive of the rights of the
parties in any subsequent suit on the
same claim," and "issue preclusion" to
describe the doctrine that "bars relitigation not only of all issues actually decided, but of all issues that might have
been decided."4 In deference to this
trend, the modern terminology is used
in this article.
The rationale of both issue and claim
preclusion is essentially the same: (1)
judicialeconomy (the courts should not
have to expend resources on matters
already determined); (2)finality (parties
should not be allowed to relitigate matters in which they have already had
ample opportunity to litigate, and their
adversaries should not be required to
defend themselves in multiple lawsuits
after they have already successfully litigated the same matter; and (3) judicial
consistency (the risk and uncertainty of
inconsistent decisions should be minimized).5

Claim Preclusion
Claim preclusion in Colorado has
been summarized as follows:
[A]n existing judgment is conclusive
of the rights of the parties in any subsequent suit on the same claim. It
bars relitigation not only of all issues
actually decided, but of all issues that
might have been decided. It requires
an identity of parties or their priorities.6

The difficulty, of course, is in determining whether a later action is the
same claim. The Colorado Supreme
Court has set forth the following test to
make this determination:
"The best and most accurate test as
to whether a former judgment is a bar
in subsequent proceedings between
the same parties ... is whether the

same evidence would sustain both,
and if it would, the two actions are
the same, and this is true although
the two actions are different in
form."7
For example, if a party to a contract
commits two breaches of contract, and
the other party brings an action for only
one of the breaches and obtains a judgment, the later claim is merged into the
earlier one, and the party is barred from
bringing a later claim on the second
breach, even though the question of the
second breach was never litigated.8
However, a party resisting claim preclusion can often defeat its assertion by
arguing that the claim in the later suit is
in fact a separate claim and thus not
subject to bar and merger.
Indeed, the test set forth in Restatement of Judgments provides the resisting party with considerable leeway for
argument: "[T]he claim extinguished
includes all rights of the plaintiff to
remedies against the defendant with respect to 'all or any part of the
transaction'"(emphasis added). What
The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Leo Weiss in the
preparation of this article.
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constitutes a "transaction" is to be determined
pragmatically, giving weight to such
considerations as whether the facts
are related in time, spare, origin, or
motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their
treatment as a unit conforms to the
parties' expectations or business understanding or usage.9
The characteristics of claim preclusion may be summarized as (1) identity
of parties and privities; (2) preclusion
of a claim not only of matters litigated,
but of matters which could have or
might have been litigated; and (3) finality of judgment. 0
Law of the Case
Sometimes confused with claim and
issue preclusion, the doctrine of "law of
the case" differs in that it requires no
finality of judgment, and is not binding
on the court. The doctrine is simply
that "[a]n issue which has been litigated
in one stage of a case should not be relitigated in a later stage."" The doctrine is
frequently applied when after an issue
is decided on appeal, the case is remanded, and on subsequent appeal after
remand, the same issue decided on the
first appeal is again raised. The Colorado Supreme Court has recently made it
clear, however, that law of the case
"merely expresses the practice of courts
generally to refuse to reopen what has
been decided." 2
Although discretionary, the law of
the case is normally applied in the interests ofjudicial economy, unless error
in the previous ruling is shown or the
previous ruling is no longer sound due
to changed conditions." The doctrine
should in no way be viewed as an impediment to review of an issue at a
higher stage in the proceedings or to a
motion for reconsideration which is
timely filed.
Issue Preclusion
Once collateral estoppel is distinguished from claim preclusion (res
judicata) and law of the case, and once
it sheds its colorful name in favor of the
more modem and descriptive label of
"issue preclusion," the doctrine becomes easier to understand and apply.
Issue preclusion differs from claim
preclusion in that it can preclude particular issues decided within a claim,
and, under certain circumstances, may
be asserted by a party other than the
parties to the earlier case. Thus, the final judicial decision on an issue ac-
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tually litigated and decided is conclusive of that issue in any later suit.
Issue preclusion is broader than res
judicata in that it applies to a cause of
action different from that involved in
the original case, but is narrower in that
it does not apply to issues which could
have been litigated but were not.14
For example, in Pomeroy v. Wait-
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ple, in McCormick v. U.S. the court
refused to use a prior guilty plea in
Colorado state court as the basis for issue preclusion, since "when a plea of
guilty has not been 'drawn into controversy' by a 'full presentation' of the
case, it may reflect only a compromise
or a belief that paying a fine is more
advantageous than litigation." 9

kus, 11 Zeiler and Waitkus were pas-

sengers in an automobile driven by
Pomeroy, who collided with an automobile driven by Vessey. Zeiler
brought an action against Pomeroy and
obtained a judgment against Pomeroy
upon a finding that he had been negligent in operating the automobile.
Waitkus later brought an action against
Pomeroy, seeking a summary judgment
against Pomeroy and asserting issue
preclusion based on the earlier judgment obtained by Zeiler. Since Pomeroy had raised the affirmative defense
of contributory negligence in the second action, the Supreme Court held
that it was error to grant a summary
judgment in favor of Waitkus because
one of the issues necessary to such a
determination (i.e., the issue of Waitkus' contributory negligence) had not
been decided in the previous action. It
would have been proper, however, to
have precluded only the issue of Pomeroy's negligence since that one issue
had indeed been fully litigated in
Zeiler's action.' 6
The court in Pomeroy adopted three
requirements for issue preclusion which
had first been set out in the landmark
case of Bernhard v. Bank of America
and a fourth taken from a series of federal cases.'I The Pomeroy requirements
are as follows:
1) Was the issue decided in the prior
adjudication identical with the issue in the present action?
2) Was there a final judgment on the
previous action?
3) Was the party against whom the
doctrine is asserted a party or a
privity to a party in the previous
case?
4) Did the party against whom the
doctrine is asserted have a "full
and fair opportunity to litigate" in
the prior case?
Identical Issue:
There are three corollaries to the first
Pomeroy requirement of identity of issue. The issue sought to be precluded
must have been actually litigated, actually decided and necessary to the resolution of the prior action.'8 For exam-

Final Judgment:
The second Pomeroy requirement
states that issue preclusion must be
based on a prior case which has gone to
a final judgment on the merits. 20 One
problem is in determining when a judgment is final. Some jurisdictions have
decided that a judgment is not final until an appeal from that judgment has
been finally decided. The Second Restatement of Judgments, however, has
adopted a more informal approach by
which the merits of the appeal are examined before regarding the judgment
as final.2'
While not ruling on this particular
problem of finality, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that collateral estoppel is applicable only when there has
been a final judicial determination.
Thus, a motion to suppress evidence,
which is only interlocutory in nature,
cannot be the basis for application of
issue preclusion nor can a denial of a
motion to quash a subpoena. 2
Parties:
The third Pomeroy requirement is
that the party against whom an issue is
to be precluded must have been a party
or a privity with a party in the prior
case. 23 Simple due process, if nothing
else, compels this requirement.2 4 No
party should be precluded from litigating an issue unless that party has already had an opportunity to have his
day in court at least once before. Although this requirement is simple
enough, it is often confused with an
older, but now abandoned requirement
that the party assertingissue preclusion
must have been a party to the prior
case. This requirement is often referred
to as the "mutuality" doctrine.
The Mutuality Doctrine-The mutuality doctrine simple states that issue
preclusion is available only "if the one
taking advantage of the earlier adjudication would have been bound by
it, had it gone against him." 3 In the
landmark case of Bernhard,2 6 for example, a party contestant in a probate action attempted to augment the estate by
challenging an alleged gift made by the
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testator to the executor, but lost on that
issue. In a later action, the same party
contestant sued the Bank of America
which disbursed the funds for the gift to
the executor, alleging that the bank negligently relinquished the funds, since
there was no gift by the testator.
Under the mutuality doctrine, the
bank could not assert issue preclusion
against the plaintiff, since had the
plaintiff won on the gift issue in the
first action, the plaintiff could not have
asserted issue preclusion against the
bank (the bank had not been a party in
the first action). Thus, there was no
"mutuality." However, the Bernhard
court gave this ancient and muchenshrined doctrine of mutuality short
shrift, stating that "there is no compelling reason ... for requiring that the

party assertingthe plea of res judicata
must have been a party, or in privity
with a party, to the earlier litigation."7
The court further noted that "no satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality."29
In a series of cases, the U.S. Supreme
Court has also abandoned the mutuality doctrine, first in patent cases and finally in a broad range of cases involving the offensive use of issue preclusion. 29 Thus, the abandonment of the
doctrine, if not yet the majority rule in
state courts, is clearly a modern trend.
Colorado has now clearly abandoned
the mutuality doctrine. As early as
1971, the Colorado Court of Appeals
noted that "modern cases do not so
limit the estoppel (by mutuality)" and
that "it is not required that the party
asserting the plea of res judicata must
have been a party."30 Furthermore, the
mutuality requirement is conspicuously
absent in the Colorado Supreme Court's
requirements for issue preclusion set
out in Pomeroy.3 1
Privity-Underthe present third requirement of Pomeroy (and even under
the old, but now abandoned mutuality
doctrine), privities to parties may be
substituted for actual parties. Examples
of privity are successors in interest,
those who have had their interests represented and those who have controlled
the prior action.32 The Colorado Supreme Court has recognized "that parties need not be identical if their interests are identical, or if the party to the
action is in privity with the party later
asserting the doctrine of res judicata,"
adopting the following language:
A personal judgment or a judgment
between parties not only binds the
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parties but those claiming under or
through the parties. Therefore such
judgments conclude, viz: 1st Parties
and 2d Parties thereto. The term
privity used in this connection denotes mutual succession or relationship to the same rights of property.
Persons standing in this relation to
the litigating party are bound by the
proceedings to which he was a party,
and the reason for this rule is, that
they are identified with him in interest, and whenever this sameness is
found to exist, all are alike estopped.33
Fair Opportunity to Litigate.
The fourth Pomeroy requirement,
adopted from a series of federal cases
rather than from Bernhard, requires
that the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had had a "full and fair
opportunity to litigate" in the prior
case. At first, this requirement appears
superfluous in light of the third requirement of having been a party or privity,
since it is a reasonable assumption that
a party always has a fair opportunity to
litigate. However, it was recognized
that for various reasons a party might
not have had a fair opportunity to litigate. This can happen, for example,
when a defendant in the first case has
no practical access to witnesses or evidence, but when sued later in a different jurisdiction has greater access to
necessary witnesses and evidence. In
addition to setting forth fair opportunity as an issue preclusion requirement in Pomeroy, the Colorado Supreme Court has applied it in at least
one case since Pomeroy.3
Offensive Use
The Pomeroy requirements, if met,
are sufficient to assert defensive issue
preclusion-to preclude a plaintiff from
relitigating an issue which the plaintiff
had previously litigated and lost against
another defendant. Additional considerations arise, however, in the case of
offensive use of issue preclusionwhere a plaintiff is seeking to preclude a
defendant from relitigating issues
which the defendant had previously litigated and lost against a different plaintiff. Although Pomeroy made no distinction between offensive and defensive use of issue preclusion, there have
been significant developments since
that case, particularly in the federal
courts.
ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore" is the
landmark U.S. Supreme Court case on

June
the offensive use of issue preclusion. In
Parklane, the Securities Exchange
Commission ("SEC") originally sued
Parklane for SEC violations, alleging in
particular that Parklane had issued misleading proxy statements; that issue was
decided adversely to Parklane. Subsequently, Parklane shareholders sued
Parklane on a common law theory, one
element of which was the identical issue of misleading proxy statements.
When the shareholders attempted to
preclude Parklane from relitigating the
issue of misleading proxy statements,
Parklane argued that such offensive use
of issue preclusion should not be permitted.
First, Parklane argued that offensive
use does not promote judicial economy, stating that the availability of its
use actually provides an incentive to a
potential plaintiff to sit out the first
lawsuit since it has nothing to lose and
everything to gain. If the issue in the
first action is resolved adversely, the
potential plaintiff is secure in the
knowledge that he may not be precluded from relitigating that issue in a second action since he was not a party in
the first action. If the issue in the first
action is decided favorably to the
potential plaintiff, however, the plaintiff gets a "free ride" in the second action. Thus, a potential plaintiff has
nothing to lose and everything to gain
by deliberately sitting out the first action, with the result that two cases are
litigated rather than one-exactly the
opposite of the intended result of issue
preclusion.
Acknowledging this perverse result in
cases where a plaintiff deliberately sits
out the first action, the court noted
that, as a matter of law, the shareholders probably could not have joined in
the SEC action and, therefore, Parklane's objections were not relevant.
Thus, the court refused to prohibit offensive use, but left it to the sound discretion of the trial court to determine if
it would be "fair." The court set out
four factors to be considered in determining whether it would not be "unfair" to allow offensive issue preclusion:
1) Could the plaintiff "easily have
joined" in the earlier action?
2) Did the party against whom preclusion is asserted have a substantial incentive to defend in the prior
action?
3) Is the judgment relied upon as the
basis of preclusion itself inconsistent with previous judgments?
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4) Does the present action afford procedural advantages to the party
against whom preclusion is asserted which were unavailable in
the first action?3 6
(It should be noted that in Colorado,
Pomeroy, which involved offensive use
of issue preclusion, pre-dated Parklane,
and, thus, did not discuss or consider
any of the Parklane"fairness" factors.)
Although it might appear that the
"easily have joined" requirement would
be the most significant barrier to offensive preclusion, the federal and state
cases after Parklane do not bear this
out.37 The issue does not appear to have
been a significant factor in any postPomeroy case in Colorado.38
Application in Civil and

Criminal Cases
Particular problems arise in the use
of a criminal judgment as the basis for
issue preclusion in a later civil suit, and
vice-versa. Obviously, a judgment in an
action requiring a lower burden of
proof cannot be used as the basis for
issue preclusion in a later case requiring
a higher burden of proof. In theory,
however, there is nothing to prevent the
reverse; i.e., using a judgment in a
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criminal case as the basis for issue preclusion in a later civil case. 39
The Colorado Supreme Court has
recently ruled that a New Mexico civil
writ of habeas corpus, not being a final
judgment, cannot be the basis for issue
preclusion in a later Colorado criminal
action.40 Also, in an early 1984 case, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a party's
acquittal on firearms charges in a federal criminal action could not be used as
the basis for a later civil forfeiture proceeding in rem against the party previously acquitted in the criminal action.4'
In the criminal context, collateral estoppel is an integral part of the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy.42 This constitutional issue is
raised only where relitigation involved
the same defendant.43 Principles of issue preclusion and double jeopardy do
arise, however, if an issue decided in
the defendant's favor in a prior hearing
is essential to the case against him in a
later proceeding."
Moreover, issue preclusion may be
applicable whether or not there is a
double jeopardy question. Where a
criminal defendant was acquitted of
second degree theft by reason of insanity, but was later adjudicated eligible for release from the hospital, principles of issue preclusion were applicable,
requiring the revocation of a separate
release hearing convened in another
county. 4 s The U.S. Supreme Court has
recently ruled that a guilty plea in a
criminal case which involved a questionable search and seizure could not
preclude the issue of whether the search
was illegal in a later civil suit against
the law enforcement officer who conducted the search.46

Federal-State Application
It is now settled that pursuant to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution and the Full Faith and
Credit Statute, a federal court must give
the same preclusive effect to a state
court judgment that the state court itself would give.47 Thus, a claim brought
in state court under a state law theory
for illegal termination of employment
has preclusive effect in a later 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 civil rights action brought in federal court, as does a state judgment patterned after the Sherman Act.48

Administrative Proceedings
In the proper case, issue and claim
preclusion may be applied to Colorado
administrative proceedings. 49 Thus,
where a tenured teacher had a full ad-

visory hearing before an administrative
board on his claim of religious discrimination, the determination of the
board had preclusive effect in a later
action before the Civil Rights Commission. 0 Federal Courts have held that
preclusive effect may be given to certain administrative decisions, provided
certain conditions have been met, and
provided the hearings are fair and are
"supported by substantial evidence."s'

Pleading Issue Preclusion
Issue preclusion, as a conceptual adjunct to res judicata, is an affirmative
defense and, therefore, must be raised
at the trial level and pled in accordance
with Rule 8(c) of the Rules of Procedure. 2
The practitioner who successfully
raises issue preclusion, as a practical
matter, will often win the whole case on
that point alone. There are several fertile areas for a successful resistance to
the assertion of issue preclusion. Obviously, the resister should give special
attention to all the Pomeroy requirements. However, the stiffest
resistance is often offered by challenging the satisfaction of the first Pomeroy
requirement-that of identity of issue.
Since the claim in the second action is,
by definition, different from the claim
in the first action, an argument can almost always be made that the issue in
the second action is actually different
from that in the first claim.
Care should be taken to identify
specifically the issues in each case with
reference to specific findings by the
court or, in the case of a special verdict
or general verdict with interrogatories,
findings by the jury. If the basis of the
assertion of issue preclusion is a general
jury verdict, an argument can often be
made that the specific issue in question
was not actually decided, and that the
general verdict can be explained by the
resolution of a different issue by the
jury.
For example, if the jury in a personal
injury action finds for the defendant in
a general verdict, the issue of the defendant's negligence should not be precluded. The jury's verdict may be explained by a finding that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent to a degree
greater than the negligence of the defendant. 3 Thus, a general verdict is usually not a good candidate for issue preclusion.
If the issue preclusion sought is offensive, the resister should refer to the
"fairness" principles of Parklane.34 No
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Colorado case has been found specifically applying Parklaneprinciples to
offensive use in Colorado. The practitioner resisting offense issue preclusion
would be well advised to argue the persuasive effect of Parklanewith the hope
that these fairness principles will be incorporated into the Colorado case law.
A strong resistance to administrative
issue preclusion can usually be made on
grounds of differences in procedure,
purpose and authority as affecting the
fundamental fairness of the preclusion.
Finally, the practitioner should be
constantly alert to issue preclusion opportunities which can be asserted in a
client's favor wherever there has been
prior litigation of any of the issues. Often, the existence of these issues is not
readily apparent and thus may require
considerable research and investigation
before the issues can be identified.
Conclusion

The practitioner asserting defensive
issue preclusion must satisfy the four
Pomeroy requirements discussed. The
litigant resisting offensive issue preclusion, however, will have the burden of
persuading a Colorado court that the
Parklane limitations on offensive use
should be incorporated into the case
law of Colorado. Although this article is
not a comprehensive review of issue
and claim preclusion in Colorado, it
hopefully provides the Colorado practitioner with an understanding of basic
issue and claim preclusion principles.
NOTES
1. A dramatic example of the conse-

quences of the application of collateral estoppel was demonstrated in Goldstein v.
Con. Ed., 426 N.Y.S.2d 646 (A.D. 1st.
Dept., 1983). In this case, a previous judgment against Consolidated Edison of New
York for gross negligence in failing to prevent the 1977 New York City blackout provided the basis for precluding Consolidated
Edison from relitigating the issue of its negligence in a later action brought by different
plaintiffs.
2. See, e.g., Hazard, Civil Procedure
(Little Brown & Co.: 1977) at 532.
3. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322 (1979) at 326, n.5.
4. Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 517 P.2d 396
(Colo. 1974).
5. Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147,
153-154 (1979). See also, Federated Dept.
Stores Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398
U.S.
(1981); Arizona v. California,
-

103 S. Ct. 1382, 1392 (1983).

6. Umberfield v. School District No. 11,
Joint Counties of Archuletta and La Plata,

185 Colo. 165, 522 P.2d 730, 732 (1974). See
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also, Hizel v. Howard, 144 Colo. 15, 17, 354
P.2d 611, 612 (1960).
7. City of Westminster v. Church, 445
P.2d 52, 55 (Colo. 1968).
8. See, Restatement, Judgment § 62
(1942), comment h, cited in, ProsperoAssoc.
v. Burroughs Corp., 517 F.Supp. 658, 661
(D.Colo. 1981), af'd, 714 F.2d 1022 (10th
Cir. 1983).
9. Restatement, Judgment § 83-92
(1942), cited in Pomeroy, supra, note 4 at
399; see also, id. at § 24 (1982), cited in,
Three Lakes Water and Sanitation Dist.,
568 F.Supp. 662 (D.Colo. 1983).
10. See, e.g., Ballas v. Cladis, 167 Colo.
248, 447 P.2d 224, 228, cert. den., 395 U.S.
921 (1969), citing, McDermott v. Bent County Colorado IrrigationDistrict, 135 Colo. 70,
308 P.2d 603 (1951); People v. Hearty, 644
P.2d 302 (Colo. 1982); Green, Basic Civil
Procedure (2d ed. 1979), at 240. See also,
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Veterans
Adm., 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
11. See, Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v.
Roosth, 306 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1962).
12. People v. County of Arapahoe, 666
P.2d 550, 553 (Colo. 1983), citing, Messenger v.Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912)
and U.S. Smelting, Refining, and Mining
Co., 339 U.S. 186 (1950).
13. Id., citing, Vol. IB Moore's Federal
Practice§ 0.404(4) (2d ed. 1982). See also,
Arizona, supra, note 5, wherein the court
applies preclusion in a pending action, while
noting that "rules of preclusion are not
strictly applicable." But see, Justice Brennan's dissent in which he sets forth the
policy considerations for the adoption of
law of the case.
14. Pomeroy, supra, note 4. See also, Hudson v. Western Oil Fields, 150 Colo. 456,
374 P.2d 403 (Colo. 1962).
15. Supra, note 4.
16. Id. at 400.
17. Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19
Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). The federal
cases include: State of Md. v. CapitalAirlines, Inc., 267 F.Supp. 298 (D. Md. 1967);
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. Univ.
of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971);
Zdlanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d
Cir.), cert. den. 377 U.S. 934 (1964); U.S. v.
United Air Lines Inc., 216 F.Supp. 709
(1962).
18. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns Manville, 681
F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982); Haring v. Prosise,
76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983); McCormick v. U.S.,
539 F.Supp. 1179 (D.Colo. 1982); Nevada v.
U.S., 103 S.Ct. 2906 (1983), dealing with
issues actually litigated. One circuit court
adopted a four-part test for determining the
identity of a prior issue:
1) Was there a substantial overlap between the evidence or argument advanced
in the second proceeding and that advanced in the first?
2) Does the new evidence or argument
involve the application of the same rule
of law as that involved in the prior proceeding?

3) Could pretrial preparation and iscovery in the first proceeding reasonably
be expected to have embraced the matter
to be presented in the second?
4) How closely related are the claims?
Starker v. U.S., 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.
1979). See also, Goodson v. McDonough
Power Equip., 443 N.E.2d 978 (Ohio, 1983),
dealing with issues actually decided; and
Mueller v. Mueller, 34 B.R. 869 (Bkrtcy,
D.Colo. 1983) and Bendix- Westinghouse
Automotive AirBrake Co. v. Latrobe Die
Casting Co., 427 F.Supp. 34 (D.Colo. 1976),
dealing with issues necessary to the resolution of the prior action.
19. McCormick, supra, note 18, citing,
Teitlebaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co.,
58 Cal.2d 601, 375 P.2d 439, 441 (1962). But
see, Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v.
CentralFinance Corp., 124 Colo. 379, 237
P.2d 1079, 1081 (1951), wherein the court
stated that a default judgment was a "conclusive adjudication as to the matters properly covered in the complaint." See also,
Bettcher v. Colorado, 140 Colo. 428, 344
P.2d 969 (1959). However, these cases predate the modern trend toward requiring that
an issue be actually litigated.
20. Supra, note 4 at 399.
21. Judgments, Second § 41, Comment C,
cited in Civil Procedure, supra, note 2 at
535. See, id. at § 41.3, comment 6 (Text
Draft No. 1-1973), cited in Civil Procedure,
supra, note 2 at 534. See also, Sandoval v.
Sup. Ct., 140 Cal.App.3d 932 (1983).
22. See, Hearty, supra, note 10; People v.
Lewis, 659 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1983); People v.
D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271, 274 (Colo. 1982);
Arizona, supra, note 5.
23. Supra, note 4; People v.Amity Mutual
Irrigation Co., 668 P.2d 1368 (Colo. 1983);
see also, Pfeffer v. Bennett, 523 F.2d 1323
(10th Cir. 1975, app. from D.Colo.).
24. The Colorado Supreme Court in National Farmers Union v. Frackelton, 662
P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1983), has adopted the following language of Blonder-Tongue, supra,
note 17 at 329:
Some litigants-those who have never appeared in a prior action-may not be collaterally estopped without litigating the
issue. They have never had the chance to
present their evidence and arguments on
the claim. Due process prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing
adjudications of the identical issue which
stand squarely against their position.
25. Cited with disapproval in Bernhard,
supra,note 17. The leading case on mutuality was Bigelow v. Old Dominion, 225 U.S.
III (1912).
26. Bernhard,supra, note 17.
27. Id. Note that the court is here using
the term "res judicata" in its broad sense to
include both issue and claim preclusion.
28. Id.
29. E.g., Blonder-Tongue, supra, note 17;
Parklane,supra, note 3.
30. Murphy v. Northern Colorado Grain
Co., 488 P.2d 103, 104 (Colo. App. 1971).

June
31. Supra, note 4.
32. See, Green, Basic Civil Procedure(2d
ed. 1977) at 241. See also, Restatement
Second of Judgments (1942) §§ 83, Comment A, 84, Comment A, 85, Text Draft #2
(1975); Hardaway, CollateralEstoppel (Colo.
CLE Civil Procedure, 1979) at II.
33. Hudson, supra, note 14 at 405, citing,
Godding v. Colo. Springs Livestock Co., 4
Colo.App. 14, 34 P. 942 (1893).
34. Amity Mutual, supra, note 23.
35. Supra, note 3.
36. Id. at 330, 331. See, e.g., DeLa Fuente
v. Stokely- VanCamp, 713 F.2d 225 (7th Cir.
1983) for the second factor; Fraley v.American Cyanamid Co., 570 F.Supp. 497
(D.Colo. 1983) for the third factor. The
court held that a jury trial was not a "procedural advantage" under the fourth criterion,
but suggested that differences in discovery
opportunities might constitute such a procedural advantage. But see, Jack Faucett Assoc. v. 17T 566 F.Supp. 296 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
37. See, e.g., R.E. Spriggs v. Adolph Coors,
156 Cal.Rptr. 738 (1979); DeLa Fuente, supra, note 36; Fraley, supra,note 36. At least
one case has met the joinder requirements
head on: Miller v. A.H. Robins Co., 565
F.Supp. 24 (D.Flor. 1983).
38. Parklaneis not, of course, directly authoritative on the state law question of the
applicability of offensive use of issue preclusion. Nevertheless, the Parklanestandards
should be persuasive. It should be noted
that under the facts in Pomeroy, there might
very well have been a joinder problem had
the issue been raised and had Parklane
already been decided. As it was, the equitable factors in offensive use were never
raised or considered in Pomeroy. However,
see the federal district court for the District
of Colorado decision, and its appeal to the
10th Circuit, in Comm. Fut.'s Trading
Comm. v. Chilcott Portfolio Management,
Inc., 713 F.2d 1477 (1983), for a tangential
discussion of Parklaneprinciples, although
even this case did not involve a discussion
of state law principles.
39. See, e.g., Teitelbaum Furs,supra, note
19. But see, CRS § 42-4-1508, preventing a
judgment in a traffic case to be used as the
basis for preclusion in a later civil action.
40. People v. Coyle, 654 P.2d 815 (Colo.
1982). There was also a problem with the
identity of the issues in this case.
41. U.S. v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 52 U.S.L.W. 4228 (U.S. Sup.Ct.
1984). The court apparently rejected its earlier rule of Coffey v. U.S., 116 U.S. 436
(1886). See also, U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242
(1980); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
42. See, People v. Matheson, 671 P.2d 968
(Colo.App. 1983); People v. Horvat, 527
P.2d 47 (Colo. 1974). See also, Colorado
Const. Art. 2, § 18; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend.
5; Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
43. People v. Swanson, 638 P.2d 46 (Colo.
1981).
44. People v. Hoehl, 629 P.2d 1083
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(Colo.App. 1981).
45. See, People v. Dist. Ct. of 21st Jud.
Dist., 553 P.2d 394 (Colo. 1976).
46. Haring,supra, note 18.
47. U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. §
1738. See, Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90
(1980).
48. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd.,
52 U.S.L.W. 4151 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1984);
Derish v.San Mateo-Burling Board of Real-

tors, 52 U.S.L.W. 2410 (9th Cir. 1984). See
also, McDonald v. City of West Branch,
Michigan, 52 U.S.L.W. 4457 (U.S. Sup.Ct.,

Apr. 17, 1984), wherein the court held that a
federal court may not give preclusive effect
to an arbitration award in a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 action.
49. Umberfield, supra, note 6. See also,
Colo. Springs Coach Co. v.State Civil Rights

Comm., 35 Colo.App. 399, 536 P.2d 838
(1975), but see, North Nat'l Bank v. State
Banking Board, 37 Colo.App. 135, 547 P.2d
253 (1975); Goldhammer, "Claim and Issue
Preclusion Arising From Unemployment
Compensation Decisions," 13 Colo.Law.
815 (May 1984).
50. Umberfield, supra, note 6. But see,
Justice Pringle's vigorous dissent, i.d at 735,
which highlights the essential problem with
applying issue and claim preclusion principles to administrative proceedings; namely,
that significant differences in function,
scope, procedures and the qualifications of
the decision-makers may affect the fundamental fairness of preclusion.
51. See, Pic. Inc. v. Prescon Corp., 485
F.Supp. 1302 (D.Del. 1980). See also, Naem
v. Brown, 595 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1979);

June
Rossi v. Mobile Oil Corp., 710 F.2d 821
(Em. App. 1983) (the court refused to give
preclusive effect to an Energy Regulatory
Commission Order); Atlantic Richfield Co.
v. Fed. Energy Admin., 556 F.2d 542, 549
(Em.App. 1977) ("The prevailing rule is that
administrative determinations may be given
collateral estoppel effect between the parties
and their privies if they are the result of fair
adversary hearings and are supported by
substantial evidence. .. ").
52. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. U.S., 382
F.2d 103 (10th Cir. from D.Colo. 1967);
Blonder-Tongue, supra, note 17.
53. Civil Procedure, supra, note 2 at
569-70.
54. Supra, note 3.

ABA to Hold Annual Meeting
August 2-9 in Chicago
The American Bar Association has scheduled a variety of programs and speakers for its 1984 Annual Meeting,
which will be held in Chicago. Most of the programs will be held at the Hyati Regency Chicago in the North Loop
area. The Board of Governors committees will meet Wednesday, August 1, and the Board will convene as a whole
August 2-3 to develop its recommendations on policy proposals to be raised in the House of Delegates sessions on
August 7-8. Substantive law sessions will be held between August 3 and 6. The new American Bar Center, located
on Northwestern University's downtown campus, will be dedicated on Sunday, August 5.
June 29 is the deadline for housing reservations, and the deadline for advance registration is July 13. Please write
or call the ABA Meetings Dept., 1155 E. 60th St., Chicago, IL 60637, (312) 947-4090; after June 15, contact the
department at 750 N. Lake Shore Dr., Chicago, IL 60611, (312) 988-5000.
The ABA's Law Student Division will hold its annual meeting August 2-5 in conjunction with the ABA Annual
Meeting. It will be held at the Palmer House Hotel in Chicago. Deadline for advance registration is July 13; for further
information, please contact Kathryn N. Wiley at (312) 947-3919.

LONDON-SUMMER 1985
For the fourth time in sixty years, the American Bar Association will meet jointly with British barristers,
solicitors and judges in London in 1985. The 1985 Annual meeting will be held in Washington, D.C. from July 4
to 10, and the London Sessions will follow from July 14 to 20.
Registration for these meetings will be on a first-come, first-served basis after space has been reserved for
governance groups of the Association, which is standing operating procedure in connection with all ABA Annual
Meetings.
The Colorado Bar Association is considering arranging a group travel plan for its members if enough interest is
expressed.
If you are interested in such a trip, at least on a preliminary basis, please return the coupon below to the bar
office. We will gather further information and report back to you.
(

Yes, I am interested in further information about a CBA group travel plan to
Washington/London during the summer of 1985.

I

Name

II
Please return to: Colorado Bar Association
250 West 14th Avenue #800
Denver, Colorado 80204

